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For the fourth straight year, mar-ket prices for Midwest cropsare low. Central Iowa soybean
prices hover around $4.00 per bushel.
Corn prices are around $1.80 per
bushel, and wheat markets remain
stuck at below $3.00 per bushel. What
to do about these low prices has occu-
pied a great deal of Congress’s time as
it attempts to craft new farm legisla-
tion. Nearly all farm bill proposals
would continue to provide farmers lev-
els of support much higher than those
offered by the market.
Senator Lugar (R-Ind.), among
others, argues that these subsidies
are self-defeating in the sense that the
subsidies induce farmers to produce,
which lowers market prices, which
then leads to increased demands for
subsidies. Strong advocates of trade
expansion criticize the subsidies be-
cause they weaken our trade negotiat-
ing position by making us vulnerable
to the charge that the U.S. should
practice what it preaches when it
comes to subsidizing farmers. And
other exporting countries criticize the
subsidies because the resulting in-
crease in U.S. supply hurts them by
lowering world market prices.
The validity of the arguments
against farm subsidies depends on
how responsive supply is to govern-
ment payments. If U.S. supply is
largely unresponsive to government
payments, then U.S. farm subsidies
have little effect on agricultural mar-
kets, other exporting countries are
not hurt by U.S. farm policies, and
our trade negotiating position
should not be affected at all. How-
ever, if subsidies induce greater U.S.
supply, then they have a downside
that should be recognized by U.S.
agriculture as it prepares for a new
round of World Trade Organization
(WTO) negotiations.
WHAT LEVEL FOR LOAN RATES?
The House and Senate have allocated
an additional $73.5 billion in agricul-
tural spending above existing baseline
levels over the next 10 years. Recently
the Administration agreed to this level
of spending. What there is no agree-
ment about is how to spend the
money. And the primary policy differ-
ence between the House, the Senate,
and the Administration is where to set
loan rates.
Loan rates put a floor on prices
farmers receive for their crops, but
they no longer put a floor on market
prices because of loan deficiency
payments (LDPs). When market
prices are below loan rates, farmers
can sell their crops at market prices
and receive an LDP—the difference
between market prices and the loan
rate—from the government. The U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA)
tries to make sure that LDP payment
rates are attractive enough so that
farmers do not forfeit their crops to
the government.
Capitalism works because people
and companies look to market prices
and their own cost of production for
guidance about what and how much
to produce. When market prices are
higher than production costs, it is a
signal to expand production. Similarly,
a drop in market price is a signal to
contract production.
For crops covered by non-re-
course loans, it is a different story.
When market prices are below loan
rates, farmers do not look at market
prices for guidance about what to
plant; instead, they look to loan rates
for guidance, because they know that
LDPs will make up the difference.
Loan rates provide what some
economists call a “hot incentive” to
produce. This means that higher
loan rates directly increase total pro-
duction and decrease market prices,
whereas a cut in loan rates should
decrease production and increase
market prices.
Congress has considered pro-
posals that range from elimination
of LDPs to dramatic increases in
loan rates. For example, the Na-
tional Corn Growers Association
(NCGA) has proposed changing the
marketing loan program to re-
course loans (which would elimi-
nate all price guarantees). And the
National Farmers Union (NFU) has
proposed increasing loan rates for
corn, soybeans, and wheat to $2.49,
$4.10, and $5.40 respectively from
their current levels of $1.89, $2.59,
and $5.26.
HIGH LOAN RATES OR LARGE
DECOUPLED PAYMENTS?
The large variation in loan rate levels
among competing proposals does
not translate into similarly large
variations in projected payments to
farmers. Nearly all proposed pro-
grams would spend at least $73.5
billion of the additional money allo-
cated to agriculture. Proposals with
lower loan rates would make up the
difference with other types of pay-
ments. For example, the NCGA pro-
posal would have continued
Agricultural Market Transition Act
(AMTA) payments and created a new
countercyclical payment program.
The NFU proposal would have elimi-
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nated AMTA payments and relied
solely on loan rates.
The key difference in these
policy proposals is whether they
rely primarily on programs that
create direct production incentives,
such as marketing loans, or
whether they rely on programs that
make payments on a fixed base.
When a farmer’s planting decision
or harvested production level has
no affect on the amount of payment
the farmer receives, then the
program payments are said to be
“decoupled.”  That is, payments
and production levels are not
related. AMTA payments are
completely decoupled from a
farmer’s current production
decision because they arrive even if
a farmer’s land is held idle.
Fixed, decoupled payments pro-
vide little incentive for a farmer to
plant because the planting decision
has no effect on the size of the pay-
ment. Some argue that increased
decoupled payments may result in
increased planted acreage because
the payments infuse enough liquid-
ity into farming operations that
farmers choose to plant some kind
of crop rather than idle land, but
this effect likely is quite small.
Payments do not have to be fixed
to be decoupled. For example, the
NCGA countercyclical payment pro-
posal would have made payments
whenever national crop revenue fell
below a target revenue level. The per-
acre payments would have been paid
to all farmers based on their average
planted acres and yield levels during a
historic base period. The payments
would have been made regardless of a
farmer’s current planting decisions
and current per-acre revenue levels.
Adoption by Congress of the NCGA
proposal would have meant that all
program payments would have been
decoupled from current production
decisions. The only possible “cou-
pling” would have been if farmers stra-
tegically planted acres of a particular
crop in order to develop a new base in
the hope that future farm bills would
allow them to update that base.
So, the choice of loan rate levels
is really a choice about how much
Congress wants to maintain planting
incentives when market prices are
low. A high loan rate policy trans-
lates into a high degree of interven-
tion. Low loan rates combined with
large decoupled payments imply a
low degree of intervention.
HOUSE AND SENATE AGRICULTURE
COMMITTEE PROPOSALS
As shown in Table 1, the House agri-
culture committee farm bill (H.R.
2646) and the Senate agriculture com-
mittee farm bill (S. 1731) give farmers
about the same level of total support,
when expressed on a per-unit basis.
The per-unit support levels include
support from loan rates, countercy-
clical payments, and fixed, decoupled
payments. Corn, wheat, and rice have
a little higher level of total support in
the House than in the Senate, and
soybeans have a little higher level of
total support in the Senate than in
the House. But overall, the total
amount of payments going to farmers
is about the same.
A comparison of these support
levels to average prices received by
farmers over the last three years or
to recent price levels indicates how
unwilling Congress is to let farmers
live by market prices.
The rough equivalence of pay-
ments masks significant differences
in the degree of intervention of the
two approaches. The House farm
bill relies heavily on a countercy-
clical payment program that would
pay farmers when prices are low.
The House countercyclical payment
programs would be decoupled be-
cause they are paid on a fixed acre-
age and yield basis and there are no
planting requirements. In contrast,
as shown in Table 2, the Senate bill
relies much more heavily on mar-
keting loans to subsidize farmers,
which implies a much higher degree
of intervention.
The higher loan rates in the Sen-
ate bill—and the associated in-
creased planting incentives—
perhaps reflect the desire of mem-
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bers of the committee to make sure
that acreage in their states contin-
ues to be used for crop production.
High-cost/low-yield production areas
are those most at risk of losing
planted acreage without the high
loan rate incentives. And important
members of the committee repre-
sent states that have high-cost/low-
yield production areas.
WTO IMPLICATIONS
Our current commitment under the
WTO is not to exceed $19.1 billion in
so-called amber-box support in any
year. Payments that fall in the amber
box are in some way related to cur-
rent production or prices. Price sup-
port payments and crop insurance
indemnities (net of the producer-paid
premium) both fall in the amber box
because they depend directly on a
farmer’s production level and/or mar-
ket price. AMTA payments do not fall
in the amber box because they are
fixed payments paid on historical
base acreage and yields. USDA de-
cided that market loss assistance
(MLA) payments belong in the amber
box because low market prices in-
duced Congress to pass them.
The decision to place MLA pay-
ments in the amber box is under-
standable when viewed in light of
the legal definition that amber-box
payments are any payments that de-
pend on current prices or produc-
tion. But the purpose of limiting
amber-box payments is to place lim-
its on government’s ability to create
incentives for farmers to produce
more than they would produce if
they responded solely to market
prices. The rationale for these limits
is that production in response to
government incentives lowers world
prices and hurts farmers in other
producing countries. The limits are
supposed to enhance market-based
competition rather than competition
in producer subsidies. Most econo-
mists would judge that MLA pay-
ments really did not create an extra
incentive to produce crops, because
a farmer did not have to produce
anything to receive the payments.
Because MLA payments fall in
the amber box, so too would the
countercyclical payments proposed
in the House and Senate agriculture
committee farm bills, even though
the payments are completely
decoupled from a farmer’s produc-
tion decisions and therefore would
not lower world prices. Under cur-
rent WTO rules, payments that have
little or no effect on world prices
count against countries’ limits on
payments that distort world prices if
they are related in some way to cur-
rent prices or production.
The irony of current WTO rules
is that the House farm bill is more
likely to result in amber-box pay-
ments in excess of our $19.1 billion
limit than the Senate bill, even
though, as shown in Table 2, the Sen-
ate bill is much more likely to lower
world prices because of the higher
loan rates.
U.S. SUBSIDIES AND FUTURE WTO
AGREEMENTS
Late last year, WTO members met in
Doha, Qatar, and agreed to work to-
ward the elimination of agricultural
subsidies. What this will mean in
practice is that countries will work
toward stricter limits on the types of
subsidies that have an impact on
other countries’ producers. Given
our unwillingness to let farmers’ in-
comes be determined by market
forces, the United States could take
the position that countries should
eliminate (or limit) all payments that
directly entice farmers to produce
more than what market prices dic-
tate. If adopted, this position would
allow Congress to subsidize farmers
all it wanted, as long as it did so with
decoupled payments. Countercyclical
payments based on historical pay-
ment bases would be allowed without
limit. Such an agreement would result
in U.S. farmers, and farmers in other
countries, growing the types and
quantity of crops demanded by the
market, while allowing Congress to
subsidize the agricultural sector to
the desired level. u
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